Author: Dimitri Nakassis. This book revises our understanding of Mycenaean society through a detailed analysis of individuals attested in the administrative texts from the Palace of Nestor at Pylos in southwestern Greece, ca. It argues that conventional models of Mycenaean society, which focus on administrative titles and terms, can be improved through the study of named individuals.
A new, methodologically innovative prosopography demonstrates that many named individuals were not only important managers of palatial affairs but also high-ranking members of the community. This work significantly broadens the elite class and suggests that the palace was less of an agent in its own right than an institutional framework for interactions amongst individuals and social groups. More Options Prices excl. Add to Cart. View PDF Flyer. Elias critically assesses two approaches to this issue that sociology offered in his time, namely the Weberian conception of individualism that postulates the human individual as the starting point of sociological thought, and the Durkheimian conception of holism, which considered society as a whole as the starting point, giving regard to holistic, supra-individual social facts.
Elias considers both of these solutions one-sided and unsatisfactory, and in his conception tries to supercede them. His strategy is close to that of Georg Simmel before him. Physical description. Document Type. Publication order reference. It takes into account the transformations discussed above and proposes a radicalisation of the notion of equality of opportunity.
The so-called 'third way' made a political ideology of this idea, where the theory of justice known as 'luck egalitarianism' had proposed an intellectual model for it. Writers such as Ronald Dworkin and Gerald Cohen paved the way for this radical version of equality of opportunity. Their stance insists on neutralising all consequences that can be ascribed to chance in the broadest sense of the term. However, there are three limits to such a view.
The first is a logical one. This radical version of equality of opportunity is intellectually appealing but unsustainable in practice, because its conceptual underpinnings are paradoxical. If all consequences of chance and circumstance must be compensated for then the range of policies to correct potential handicaps is subject to unlimited expansion. Virtually nothing is the result of pure choice. The second limit is sociological. If we adopt the radical approach, individuals have to be desocialised in order that they might be treated as true equals.
To enforce this would require a draconian, illiberal and politically untenable removal of external influences, such as the family, which would otherwise shape the destinies of children and so work against a radical equality of opportunity. The third limit is a political one. A society subject to the meritocratic principle alone would be rigidly hierarchical. This was the society envisioned by the Saint-Simonians.
They went further than others in making the elimination of inheritance and destruction of the family central tenets of their doctrine. Prosper Enfantin, a proponent of Saint-Simonianism, went so far as to say that its followers 'believe in natural inequality among men and regard such inequality as the very basis of association, the indispensable condition of social order'.
A hundred years later, RH Tawney criticised the Saint-Simonian position for offering 'equal opportunities to become unequal'. And Michael Young, in The Rise of the Meritocracy , painted a very dark portrait of meritocracy, given that - paradoxically - it ends in consecrating inequality. Theories of equality of opportunity can and therefore should serve as a basis for policies of reduction of inequalities, but are incapable of establishing a general social theory.
This is for the reasons given above, but also because radical visions of equality of opportunity consider the form and legitimacy of interindividual differences but have nothing to say about social structure in itself. That is why we need a positive theory of social equality, a fourth avenue for exploration.
What we need is a new model of solidarity and integration in an age of singularity. If more redistribution is needed today, it has to be relegitimated - but how?
The answer is through a redefinition of equality with a universalist dimension. That is to say, through a return to the revolutionary vision that existed in France and in the United States of equality as a social relation and not as an arithmetic measure. Equality was then understood primarily as a relation, as a way of making a society, of producing and living in common. It was seen as a democratic quality and not only a measure of the distribution of wealth.
This relational idea of equality was articulated in connection with three other notions: similarity, independence and citizenship. Similarity entails an equality as equivalence : to be 'alike' is to have the same essential properties, such that remaining differences do not affect the character of the relationship.
Independence is equality as autonomy : it is defined negatively as the absence of subordination and positively as equilibrium in exchange. Citizenship involves equality as participation , which is constituted by community membership and civic activity. Consequently, the project of equality as relationship was interpreted in terms of a world of like human beings or semblables , a society of autonomous individuals and a community of citizens.
Equality was thus conceived in terms of the relative position of individuals, the rules governing their interactions, and the principles on which their life in common was based. The rights of man, the market and universal suffrage were the underlying institutions. Economic inequalities were seen as acceptable in this framework only if they did not threaten the other modes of relational equality that defined the society of equals.
These representations, which were formulated in a precapitalist world, were undermined by the industrial revolution, which initiated the first great crisis of equality. In order to overcome the second great crisis, we must recapture the original spirit of equality in a form suitable to the present age. Equality of singularities does not imply 'sameness'. Rather, each individual seeks to stand out by virtue of their unique qualities, and the existence and acceptance of diversity becomes the very standard of equality. Everyone is similar by dint of being incomparable. The aspiration to such singularity can take shape only in the individual's relation to others.
If the meaning of a person's life lies in their difference from others, then they must coexist with those others. This is why it is important to distinguish between singularity and autonomy or identity.
Society of Individuals Paperback – October 15, The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations by Norbert Elias Paperback $ Norbert Elias, , was a member of the Frankfurt School of social philosophers. PDF | On Jul 1, , Sébastien Chauvin and others published The Society of Individuals.
Autonomy is defined by a positional variable and is essentially static. Identity is defined by constitutional variables; a composite quality, it is basically given, although it may evolve over time. By contrast, singularity is defined by a relational variable - it is not a state. The difference that defines singularity binds a person to others; it does not set them apart.
This form of equality defines a type of society whose mode of composition is neither abstract universalism nor identity-based communitarianism but rather the dynamic construction and recognition of particularity, or difference. This shift has significant implications.
It suggests that individuals now seek to participate in society on the basis of their distinctive rather than common characteristics. Singularity is not a sign of withdrawal from society individualism as retreat or separation but is instead an expectation of reciprocity or mutual recognition. This marks the advent of a fully democratic age: the basis of society lies not in nature but solely in a shared philosophy of equality. One central element of such a democratic society of singularities is gender equality. The essential problem is how to ensure that men and women can live together as equals.
This is an inherently relational issue; they do not exist separately at first only to enter into communication later on. The gender distinction is fundamental to a deeper understanding of the egalitarian ideal and a laboratory for exploring ways to intertwine similarity and singularity ever more closely.
But where is the border? But this is too simple. Main article: Hunter-gatherer society. They come and go as it suits them. This is really a monumental enterprise, very worthwhile and very constructive, presenting a great challenge to the contemporary intellectual and academic scene - and UCD Press should be congratulated in undertaking this enterprise.
Tocqueville placed great stress on the idea that selfishness is 'to societies what rust is to metal'. Today, one might say that the absence of reciprocity is the most critical source of corrosion. People are more likely to contribute to collective projects or costs if they believe that other citizens feel the same way. Conversely, any perceived disruption of reciprocity can lead to withdrawal in one form or another. Inequality is most acutely felt when citizens believe that rules apply differently to different people, or when they see intolerable differences in the way different individuals are treated by certain institutions.
They resent the double standard, the sense that they alone are 'playing by the rules' while others find a way to circumvent those same rules for their own advantage.
In another light, Richard Sennett has noted 'modern society's hatred of parasitism'. Sentiments such as these are a critical source of social distrust, which in turn undermines the legitimacy of the welfare state and fosters aversion to taxes. If we are to create a society of equals, no task is more urgent than to restore reciprocity.
This requires a number of changes.